Federalist paper 72. Federalist Paper Summaries Flashcards 2019-01-22

Federalist paper 72 Rating: 4,8/10 495 reviews

The Federalist No. 72, [19 March 1788]

federalist paper 72

The history of Rome and the ancient Greek republics proved this, as well as the operations under various state governments. This exclusion whether temporary or perpetual would have nearly the same effects; and these effects would be for the most part rather pernicious than salutary. These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the principle of exclusion. The answer depends on how we define republicanism and federalism. May he not be less willing by a firm conduct, to make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression that a time is fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only may, but must, be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon an inferior, footing? If even no propensity had ever discovered itself in the Legislative body, to invade the rights of the Executive, the rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves teach us, that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of self-defence.

Next

The Federalist (Dawson)/72

federalist paper 72

In Chapter 72, the president should be eligible for re-election. Before the vote to approve the unitary executive, Sherman also commented that advisory councils in the majority of the states and even in Great Britain served to make the executive acceptable to the people. Without supposing the personal essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any similar crisis, for another, even of equal merit, would at all times be detrimental to the community, inasmuch as it would substitute inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and set afloat the already settled train of the administration. If the exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to entertain apprehensions, would with infinite reluctance yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post, in which his passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. There are men who could neither be distressed, nor won, into a sacrifice of their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and in the main it will be found, that a power over a man's support is a power over his will. These functions require duration and stability in office and when another obtains the office by nature he will undo much of what has been done and will change the personnel filling the subordinate positions of the administration.


Next

The Federalist 72 < The Complete Federalist Papers < 1786

federalist paper 72

Hamilton defends the presidential veto by pointing to the necessity of holding legislative authority in check. These considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous mutability in the administration of the government. But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his independence? Alexander Hamilton, along with many other , believed the solution to this and problems of federal law enforcement could be solved with a strong general government. That experience is the parent of wisdom, is an adage the truth of which is recognized by the wisest as well as the simplest of mankind. Analysis No comment is needed here on Hamilton's outline of what a president's powers should be, or the duration of his term in office. His avarice might be a guard upon his avarice. What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these disadvantages? Shall the Union be constituted the guardian of the common safety? Though this plan was rejected, 's proposal for a unitary executive, which Hamilton supported, was upheld with a vote of seven to three.

Next

The Federalist (Dawson)/72

federalist paper 72

In the case for which it is chiefly designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would avail himself of his constitutional means of defence, and would listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. They are represented to be: 1st, greater independence in the magistrate; 2nd, greater security to the people. By 1787, both Congress and the states had accumulated considerable debt from the , but the Articles of Confederation denied Congress the powers of taxation and regulation of foreign and interstate commerce. And if he had been fortunate or adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the people, he might induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint upon themselves, a provision which was calculated to debar them of the right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite. Madison followed Jefferson as the fourth president of the United States.

Next

The Complete Federalist Papers < 1786

federalist paper 72

This, nevertheless, is the precise import of all those regulations which exclude men from serving their country, by the choice of their fellow-citizens, after they have by a course of service fitted themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility. And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention ought to have confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of the proposed government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. To navigate within this edition, use the above navigational links. A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the administration. Have we not had unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished? But even in that case, may he have no object beyond his present station to which he may sacrifice his independence? Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would on the contrary deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that he must quit the scene, before he could accomplish the work, and must commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might be unequal or unfriendly to the task.


Next

The Federalist #23

federalist paper 72

Hamilton felt that if an administration was conducted efficiently and for the welfare of the people it should be perpetuated. Theme: Presidential Power Focus: Adequate Provision for Support, and Competent Powers and the veto power. Hamilton was also inspired by and , who favored an executive who would act on his own prerogative while maintaining respect for constitutional obligations. By necessitating a change of men, in the first office in the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures. The tenure by which they are to hold their places. What could have been one of the arguments used by those who proposed the 22ndAmendment? It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed Constitution.

Next

Federalist No. 70

federalist paper 72

If, however he knows that his efforts could possibly be compensated by reelection, he will be more likely to travail and facilitate his country favorably. Both of and of had suggested advisory councils that would serve as a support rather than a check on the executive. Unless the exclusion be perpetual there will be no pretence to infer the first advantage. It is not an easy point to determine whether his independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an arrangement. If the exclusion were to be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could be reason in any case to entertain apprehension, would, with infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking his leave forever of a post in which his passion for power and pre-eminence had acquired the force of habit. Subsequently they were printed in manyeditions and translated to several languages.

Next

The Federalist No. 72, [19 March 1788]

federalist paper 72

The primary inducement to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design. At these times it is necessary for the people whom they have appointed to give the public time for cooler heads to prevail. In this address, written most likely by Samuel Bryan and signed by twenty-one members of the minority, the lack of an executive council is enumerated as the twelfth of fourteen reasons for dissent: 12. A king of Great Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day, hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two houses of Parliament. It is at any rate far less probable that this should be the case, than that such views should taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. On December 18, 1787, after the Convention of Pennsylvania, which ultimately ratified the Constitution, the minority published its reasons for dissent to its constituents.

Next

The Federalist Papers Essay 72 Summary and Analysis

federalist paper 72

In fact, Hamilton's call for energy in the executive, as described in Federalist No. With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the circumstance of re-eligibility. It has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently with success. May he have no connections, no friends, for whom he may sacrifice it? In both cases, the majority of the court was not persuaded that the expansions in executive power in question were justified. Pol'y 25 2001 : 487. What are the advantages promised to counterballance these disadvantages? Party Members at the time never utilized the name Democratic-Republican because it was the Republican Party.

Next

The Complete Federalist Papers < 1786

federalist paper 72

These expressions, taken in all the latitude of the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. Four years would be long enough, but not too long. As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater reason to entertain doubts concerning it. Hamilton was a nationalist who emphasized strong central government and successfully argued that the implied powers of the Constitution could be used to fund the national debt, assume state debts, and create the government-owned Bank of the United States. He served as Secretary of the Treasury during Washington's presidency and distinguished himself through his strong financial policy and leadership. Jones' Impact on the American Presidency.

Next